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Lawrence J. Jost (Cincinnati)
Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, 
whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for 
when they consider recent studies of the topic. Owen's pio­
neering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena"1 
to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership 
with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified 
and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Ap­
pearances" in the Owen festschrift.2 While both of these 
scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nico- 
machean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE 
respectively), their.primary focus has been on scientific 
reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical 
disciplines of ethics or politics. Two recent studies by 
Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they 
both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich 
critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works 
stretching back to the early 19th Century.3 Their use of the 
plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's 
thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to 
different stages in his development but one quickly discovers 
that this is not the case. This is because both Irwin and 
Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area 
in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE dis­
cussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both 
works in formulating an overall picture of Aristotle's approach 
to ethical method. They do not raise the question I wish to 
address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
2surveys of relevant passages in both works that they do provide, 
not to mention the modest defence of Aristotle that they offer 
in comparison with other ethical methodotogists (e.g. Sidgwick 
and Rawls). The question which I freely admit is not altogether 
new is: are there any distinctive contributions that the EE, as 
opposed to the NE, makes to the study of ethical method? Since 
Kenny's two recent studies1* have shed a powerful new light on 
the relationship between the two works I believe it is time to 
consider the question afresh. It is true that Kenny's prede­
cessor in this particular vineyard, D.J. Allan, 25 years ago 
in the same Symposium Aristotelicum that featured Owen's path- 
breaking paper, weighed in with his "Quasi-mathematical method 
in the Eudemian Ethics"5, a paper which clearly offers a plau­
sible answer to my question. Allan claimed to find a distinctive 
"mathematical pattern of deduction" at work in the EE, one that 
applies "Euclidean method" to ethical argument and draws more 
freely than does the NE on other Aristotelian works such as the 
Metaphysics for its premisses.6 His account, however, seems 
vulnerable in light of an important distinction that Barnes, 
especially, has pressed in connection with the Posterior Ana­
lytics , viz. that between a method designed for research or 
the discovery of the archai or starting points of a science 
thátneed not be cast in syllogistic form and the rather dif­
ferent methods recommended for presentation of the results of 
inquiry which may well call for a rigorous, axiomatized system.7 
If suchadistinction is feasible for theoretical sciences, it ■ 
would seem even more likely that in ethics one need not oppose 
as irreconcilable the more informal dialectical method of pre­
senting and sifting through various endoxa (opinions which 
have found favor with the many or the wise) and a formally 
valid deductive demonstration such as that found in EE II.1 
(1218b31-1219a39), an argument which, as Woods has observed,
"is considerably more elaborate than the corresponding argu-
3ment in E.N."8 Thus, even if Allan were correct in directing 
our attention to a preference in the EE for a quasi-geometric 
laying down of hypotheses, this fact would not preclude simul­
taneous appeal to the endoxic method for the generation of ac­
ceptable archai or starting points. Furthermore, while the NE 
does not use 'hypothesis' in its technical sense (as does the 
EE at 1222b28 and 1230b30) in its undisputed books (i.e. I-IV 
and VIII-X), it does, as Kenny notes9, employ 'hypokeitai' in
the requisite fashion at least once at 1104b27. The most con- 
reason
vincing^for not treating Allan's proposal as the key to a dis­
tinctive ethical method, however, is that the best and clearest 
statements of endoxic method in the entire corpus are either to 
be found in exclusively Eudemian material or in the so-called 
common or disputed books (NE V,VI,VII = EE IV,V,VI). This can 
be easily established by consulting any of the authorities al­
ready mentioned. Owen, Nussbaum, Irwin and Barnes all use the 
same passage from the book on akrasia, i.e. 1145b2-7, as well 
as similar remarks from the same discussion, as the foundation 
for their conceptions of endoxic method. Even more striking 
than this is the appeal to undoubtedly Eudemian passages such 
as 1216b26-3410 or 1214b28-1215a711. None of these scholars 
ha« paused to ask why the choicest passages for illustrating 
the method come from outside securely Nicomachean borders.
That such distinguished Aristotelian interpreters ignore this 
question testifies to the overwhelming inertia of the tradition's 
full 10-book NE,influencing even those who appreciate the EE's 
potential contributions to theory but see no reason to award 
it the disputed books let alone entertain the possibility that 
its undisputed portions may represent an advance on the NE. In 
the light, however, of Kenny's systematic study of these and 
other questions concerning the relationship between the two 
works, the fact that the Eudemian environment is particularly 
hopitable to endoxic method by comparison with the NE is surely
4worthy of note, even extended examination.
Before going on to contrast the two works on questions of 
method in some detail, it will be helpful to appeal to an impor­
tant hypothesis about the common or disputed books. Although 
there is not space to argue the point here, I have elsewhere 
outlined Kenny's treatment of the problem and even so skepti­
cal a scholar as C.J. Rowe has been convinced by Kenny's ar­
guments .12 The claim is that the disputed books are clearly 
more at home in their Eudemian rather than Nicomachean sur­
roundings, a result based on a "succession of arguments, his­
torical, philological, and philosophical" presented in The 
Aristotelian Ethics13, especially those based on the computer- 
assisted statistical study of vocabulary and style which con­
stitutes the heart of Kenny's case. An indication that the 
book as a whole makes a very strong case, indeed, can be seen 
in Rowe's recent admission that his own previous intuition 
(shared by most scholars, perhaps) that the NE contained the 
CB (Common Books) as an integral part of an organic whole had 
been "deal[t] a near-lethal blow" by Kenny's work and that he 
is now inclined to accept Kenny's solution to the CB problem, 
having renounced his own earlier and opposing position.1 * Al­
though many no doubt remain unconvinced by this controversial 
call for a radical re-assessment of our views of the EE-NE re­
lationship I will nonetheless hypothesize for purposes of this 
discussion of methodology that references drawn from the middle 
books (to be referred to by the familiar Bekker numbers with a 
CB prefix, e.g. CB 1145b2-7) are not to be treated as expressing 
NE doctrine; indeed, the opposite is more likely to be the case, 
viz. that they reflect EE content that may or may not be compat­
ible with NE views.
The strategy in what follows will be to look first at un­
doubtedly NE passages for methodological remarks, noting how 
spare such as can be found really are when compared with un-
5doubtedly EE material. Eventually we shall be in position to 
suggest that it is the EE and not the NE which must be given 
the credit for containing the fullest account of a fully self- 
conscious employment of endoxic method in ethics, the same 
general method that commetators are so ready to see at work in 
other important Aristotelian works such as the Physics and Meta­
physics. That such a finding would tend to support Allan's "im- 
ression...that the systematizer [the author of the EE] is the 
later Aristotle" as well as Kenny's conjecture^%íie EE postdates 
the NE15 is a partial and tentative result of a series of re­
lated investigations that I've begun in order to test,Kenny's 
hypothesis.16
In the first book of the NE the most explicitly methodo­
logical passages are two (viz. 1094bll-27 and 1098a26-b8), both 
of which stress the need to give up any thoughts of achieving 
accuracy (ακρίβεια) in ethical-political inquiry primarily due 
to the variability of the subject matter itself as compared 
with that of geometry, say. This, of course, is a familiar and 
endearing theme in Aristotle's ethics but the passages taken 
together do not compare very favorably with EE I 's chapter 6 
as a whole which provides a clearly worked out account not only 
of endoxic method at 1216b26-35 as employing phainomena as wit­
nesses and paradigms of the truth but also introduces more 
subtlety and scientific sophistication in its discussion of 
what to look for in a properly philosophical account. Whereas 
the NE is content to recommend that the educated person be 
sesitive enough to expect demonstration from a mathematician 
but not from a rhetorician, the EE worries about even the ex­
perienced and capable going astray by being urged to swallow
arguments that are "foreign to the inquiry (αλλοτριουί) and 
/
idle (κεναυ5)" [Woods' rendition of 1217a2-3; unless other­
wise indicated further English versions of EE passages will be 
drawn from this (partial) translation]. That is, those students
6who know that they should welcome explanations°%he why (to dia ti) 
of things as well as the that (to ti)(1216b38-9) and that philo-
sophers should never "speak in an unconsidered fashion (εικτι ), 
but always with reason" (μετά λογου)(1217al-2) still may be 
taken in by the "ignorance" or "charlatanry" of "men who nei­
ther have nor are capable of architectonic or practical thought" 
(1217a3-7) . An example at this juncture would certainly help 
but, perhaps, the criticism at b21 of Plato's Form of the Good 
will suffice if we grant that a "logical" point about Forms be­
longs to another study (ετέρο^ átatpiBhS )r one "foreign to" 
ethics or politics, strictly speaking. The language of the dis­
missal - λέγεται λογικω£ και κενω$ - recalls 1217al-2, at least 
in part, although it must be admitted that Plato can not be 
accused of trickery or ignorance. If this is an example, then, 
it will be of a very sophisticated lack of relevance but one 
that the student of ethics should still resist nonetheless.
While a detailed comparison.of particular passages such 
as those of the last paragraph are desirable in a fuller·study, 
a somewhat more impressionistic approach will indicate the type 
of contrast I believe there to be between the NE and EE on 
matters of method. If we focus on the technical vocabulary of 
endoxic method, especially as described by Barnes, a surprising 
fact emerges fairly clearly, viz. that the undoubtedly Nicoma- 
chean portions are noteworthy for their relatively slight em­
ployment of key terminology. Take 1endoxos1 itself, for in­
stance, a word that can almost always be translated as 'repu­
table' or 'of good repute' even when it occurs in the familiar 
neuter plural (τα ένδοξα ) meaning 'the reputable things', i.e. 
reputable views or opinions. Barnes notes that before Aristotle 
(first? f^lèe^d j ective to views or tenets ‘éndoxos'typically modi­
fied men of considerable standing in the community in the orators 
and Xenophon.17 What is most remarkable about its occurences in 
the NE is that they all (apart from CB 1145b5, of course) corres-
7pond to this ordinary Attic usage. 1098b28 refers to a "few re-
) /  \ V ) /
putable men" (ολίγοι και ένδοξοι ανδρεί ), for example, while
1122b31-2 mentions the "well-born and reputable" (τοί$ ευγενεσι 
και το?|^ενδοξοiS ). The neuter plurals at 1127a21 and b25 are
also to/\understood along the same lines as Irwin's translation
makes clear when he renders them both as "the qualities that win 
reputation", the sort of thing that Socrates, Aristotle's exam­
ple here, disavowed having. Thus, none of these NE occurrences 
approximate the typical use of 'endoxa' as found in the Topics 
(in its "definition" at 100b21, for instance, or as frequently 
’found elsewhere - 104a21, 159bl3,14 et passim) or The Rhetoric 
(e.g. 1355al7, 1357al0). Now, it is true that the undoubtedly 
Eudemian avoids the term altogether and this may be significant. 
By Kenny's hypothesis, however> we are entitled to see its 
crucial appearance in the following central passage about akrasia 
as credited to the EE account:
Here, as in all other cases, we must set down the appear­
ances (phainomena)and, first working through the puzzles 
(diaporesantes), in this way go on to show, if possible, 
the truth of all the beliefs we hold (ta endoxa) about 
these experiences; and, if this is not possible, the 
truth of the greatest number and the most authoritative.
For if the difficulties are resolved and the beliefs 
(endoxa) are left in place, we will have done enough 
showing. (Nussbaum's rendering of CB 1145bl-718)
Two other terms that are featured in this passage also worth
comment. The neuter plural τα φαινόμενα in the typical sense
of 'the things that seem to be the case' or 'the apparent facts'
\ /
as reflected in what is usually said (τα λεγομενα) can be fdund 
elsewhere in the NE only at CB 1145b28. This situation contrasts 
most sharply with the example of the undoubtedly Eudemian which 
repeatedly employs the term (e.g. at 1216b28, 1217al3, 1228al9, 
1235a31, bl6-17, 1236a26 and b22). This observation of an im­
portant difference between the NE and EE vocabulary is not 
meant to obscure the fact that occurrences of the cognate verb
8phainesthai (e.g. at NE 1095a30 or 1113a21 as Irwin*9for one, 
interprets them) in a suitable context might be amenable 
to the general method of tithenai ta phainomena. But, it does 
suggest for the NE a much less developed technical vocabulary 
than that which can be routinely observed in the Physics, for 
example, as described by Owen.20 When we see that the EE, on 
the other hand, does conform to this pattern it does seem to 
reflect a stage in the development of endoxic methodology 
that is more self-conscious than that at work in the NE.
The second important term referred to above, viz. δ ι α­
πορεί v ('puzzling through') as well its near synonym απορεΤν 
and the noun aporia can be found at NE 1096al2, 1100a21,30,bl2 
and 1101a35 although the EE usage of these terms is signifi­
cantly more extensive. Susemihl's index provides more than 20 
relevant examples. This again suggests that the endoxic méthodes 
pre-occupation with overcoming or resolving aporia ('puzzlement', 
'no way out') is more routinely at work in the EE than in the NE 
if we can use relative frequency of technical terminology as a 
rough guide. Furthermore, the CB's pithy η γαρ Xuois τη$ αττο- 
pias ευρεσι$ ε.στιν (1146b7-8) - "for the solution of the puzzle 
is a discovery", a remark which captures and admirably com­
presses the final stage of the general method as described most 
fully by Barnes, should not be awarded to the NE as is the cus­
tom if Kenny is right about the disputed books.
That such key terms so crucial to an understanding of en­
doxic method as those just canvassed are quite at home in the 
EE (with the exception of 'endoxos'), while being either unused 
in the relevant application in the NE (ta endoxa, ta phainomena) 
or underutilized therein (diaporein, aporein, aporia), bears out 
our preliminary observation that the EE's explicit^ concern with 
methodology is more pronounced than the NE's as well as more in 
line with what can be seen elsewhere in the corpus where the 
method is at work on non-ethical subjects (e.g. the Physics or
9Metaphysics.)
Obviously, nothing uncovered so far suggests any funda­
mental change in method from one work to the other, an "episte­
mological break" as it were with his methodological past, but 
rather a more systematic development, perhaps, and more exten­
sive employment of techniques for discovery that had been nur­
tured by Aristotle from his Academy days. Whether a stronger 
claim than this can be defended is difficult to say at this 
Stage of the investigation. One additional word that may be 
a sign of a negative attitude toward some endoxa, those held 
by the hoi polloi, is χαρίει$ , which means 'refined', 'culti­
vated', 'accomplished' in Attic prose of the 4th Century B.C.
It can be found nine times in the NE but not at all in the EE. 
Since the Topics first opposed the views of the many to those 
of the wise, playing off each against the other whenever pos­
sible, although both are sources of endoxa, Aristotle's works 
are studded with this sort of dialectical relationship. When 
the NE uses 'charientes' in place of the more customary 'sophoi', 
then, the contrast with the EE is worth comment. The term it­
self is familiar from Plato who employs it to refer to a group 
of wags or witty critics (comic poets like Aristophanes?) at 
Republic 452B and also later in the same work at 605B where 
Grube translates it as "the better sort of citizens" (χαριεσ- 
xepouj). Aristotle's usage is similar in that it can be re­
stricted to a particular sub-group of specialists (the best 
doctors at NE 1102a21) or, more typically, to denote the truly 
cultivated gentlemen of the polis who will be expected to be­
have with appropriate noblesse oblige (1128a31, bl,1162bl0). We 
know from the Politics that mere position in the social struc­
ture does not bestow the quality of refinement (1297b9); hence, 
a degree of culture and sophistication are no doubt necessary.
In spite of this, however, there can be no doubt that‘charieis1 
is a term with overtones of class and suitable breeding, a note
10
not heard in the EE. A typical appearance of the word occurs at 
NE 1095al8-19 where it obviously does duty for 'sophos'. After 
noting that both hoi polloi kai hoi charientes agree on synonyms 
for eudaimonia he goes on to point out with some emphasis that 
hoi polloi don't provide the same account of its nature or 
essence as hoi sophoi. Similarly, at 1095b22, whereas the many 
are drawn toward a life of shameful self-indulgence the charien­
tes kai praktikoi (the refined with a practical orientation, 
taking the και explicatively) prefer honor (time). Thus, by his 
choice of loaded language Aristotle seems to betray an attitude 
of favoritism toward the opinions of the wise or refined, a fact 
which threatens to undermine the objectivity of the endoxic me­
thod. That is, we are presumably supposed to sift through all 
relevant opinions that are worth study, preserving the best and 
discarding the rest. The danger of bias would be even more ap­
parent if a negative attitude toward the many were also evident 
(as in the case of Plato). Now, Barnes claims to see here at 
NE 1095al8 "[r]espect for the views of οι πολλοί" even as he 
notes in passing a text that clearly goes against this sugges­
tion, viz. 1095bl6 where the many are linked with those who are 
φορτικώτατοι ('most common', 'most vulgar') in their choice of 
the lowest of the three lives.21 The picture seems to be one 
where the unanimous agreement of the many, the wise and the 
refined, such as we find in the equation of eudaimonia with 
to eu zen and to eu prattein (1095al9), is a sufficient guar­
antee of the worth of the endoxon. Where they differ, however, 
the "better sort" are more likely to be in the right. A good 
example comes from Book X where Anaxagoras' view of what makes 
for the happy man is said to appear strange to the many (NE 
1179al3-15) who judge by externals; the author goes on to say 
"the beliefs of the wise would seem to accord with our argu­
ments" (Irwin). It is true that Aristotle goes on to suggest 
that the truth in practical matters must be judged by deeds
11
and life as it is actually lived (al7-20), seeming to suggest 
a return to the many's terra firma. The appearance is mislead­
ing, though, for, by the end of the chapter we are once again 
on the side of the wise and the contemplative, secure in the 
assurance that they are the most beloved of the gods as well 
as the happiest of men (1179a29-32). The impression, then, 
of the preparation of a brief for the wise carefully prepared 
by the NE as a whole certainly contrasts at first glance with 
the advice offered a would-be sophistical refuter at SE 173a20- 
23 where an even-handed strategy is recommended:
You ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of 
the majority (πολλοί^) and of the wise - if a man speaks 
as trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions 
opposed to the majority; if he speaks as do the majority, 
to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. (Forster)
Even here the -author can not help but point out at a28-31 that 
the opinion of the many is only nomos ('custom', 'law') while 
things said by the wise reflect physis ('nature') and alitheia 
('truth'). In other words, even supposedly democratic Sophists 
show a decided preference for the wise. We expect Aristotle 
not to be similarly biased if he is to remain faithful to his 
method and yet the NE can be read (I don't say must be) as vin­
dicating the charientic side of debates more often than not.
Is the EE more even-handed? There are some signs that 
it is when we consider,for example, how it deals with first 
philia (the primary sort of frienship that exists between two 
equally virtuous men) when contrasted with the parallel NE 
treatment. The latter account is uncomfortable with the clear 
fact that men call pleasure-friends and utility-friends philoi; 
it proposes therefore to derive these secondary forms καθ' 
ομοχοτητα from the primary and governing use of the word (protos 
kai kurios) as said of virtue-friends (NE 1157a25-32). In what 
certainly appears to be a reply to this passage the EE rejects 
the idea that pleasure-friends are not really friends because
12
they fall below first philia standards of reliability(EE 1236b 
17-21). Introducing the important idea of pros hen homonymy, 
the EE goes on to claim:
Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to pri­
mary friendship is to do violence to the phainomena, and 
compels one to talk paradoxes; though it is not possible 
to bring all friendship under one definition. The only re­
maining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the 
primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a 
sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by ac­
cident and standing in a merely chance relationship to 
one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but 
rather as related to one thing. (Rackham, 1236b21-6)
This obvious defence of ordinary language via the sophisticated 
device of 'focal meaning' certainly appears to be a careful re­
action to the NE's predicament of wishing to maintain a rigid 
hierarchy of eide of philia and yet deign to speak with the 
vulgar of friends whose only ties are pleasure or utility. The 
EE brings in one of the most powerful tools from the metaphysi­
cal arsenal to rectify the situation. Each form of philia is 
related to a common focus while the priority of virtue-friend­
ship is preserved without flying in the face of the many's way 
o■£ talking or siding only with the charientes.
The argument of the last paragraph will no doubt be re­
sisted by many scholars and much more needs to be said to shore 
up its main assumptions. Pending that, can anything of the im­
pressionistic variety avail us here? Does the EE, for instance, 
show a more postive attitude to the many than the NE? At 1222al7 
the agathos is said to feel delight (chairein) as he should ,(hos 
dei) even if it is more delight than the hoi polloi experience 
and at 1222a40 both we ourselves and the many posit as a vice 
opposed to the mean state a direction we are more inclined to 
embrace. Neither of these texts casts aspersions on the many.
The brave man at 1228b34 and 37 is said to be less vulnerable 
than the hoi polloi kai hoi pleistoi to certain pressures, but 
this is not surprising nor detrimental to the many. A hint of
13
snobbery seems to emerge at 1238a27 where it is said that "even 
the many would agree" with a claim about philia but this passage 
is hardly an indictment. Again, at 1243a38 a slightly cynical 
tone seems to lie behind the statement that hoi polloi pursue 
to kalon ek periousias ('out of a state of surplus or plenty'), 
implying that virtue is easier to go after when times are good. 
But, while certainly true enough, such an observation need not^ 
betray a sustained antipathy to the many as we saw conveyed, for 
instance, by the 'most vulgar' label noted above in the NE. None 
of these or similar passages that crop up in the EE would support 
such a negative stance although one very important text not yet 
mentioned has been interpreted by Barnes as recommending that 
"opinions peculiar to <Λ πολλοί, the vulgar herd, should be ig­
nored".22 This is the textually very difficult passage at 1214b 
28-1215a7 which requires emendations that are far from certain:
It would be superfluous to examine all the opinions about 
happiness that find adherents. Many opinions are held by 
children and by the diseased and mentally unbalanced, and 
no sensible man would concern himself with puzzles about 
them; the holders of such views are in need, not of argu­
ments, but of maturity in which to change their opinions, 
or else of correction of a civil or medical kind (for med­
ical treatment is no less a form of correction than flog­
ging is). Similarly, neither need we examine the views of 
the many; they speak in an unreflective way on almost any 
topic, most of all when they speak about this; only the 
opinions of reasonable men should be examined; it would 
be strange to present argument to those who need not ar­
gument, but experience. But, as each inquiry has its own 
problems, so, evidently does that concerning the best and 
highest life. It is these opinions, then, that it is right 
for us to investigate; for the refutation of those who 
dispute a certain position is a demonstration of the op­
posing view (Woods, with my emphasis on the sentence at a3)
If we accept the Greek text behind this translation, it certainly
does look as though a resolute opposition to the views of the
many is, after all, at work in the EE. Still, one should be wary
of endorsing this option. Irwin joins Decarie23 in treating the
underlined phrasing above as an obvious intrusive gloss and a
14
glance at Susemihl's apparatus or even Barnes' discussion re­
veals many proposals for generating a sound text. What does seem 
clear, however^^as^^de? the sick and insane to the NE's youths 
as unlikely sources of endoxa worth serious consideration and it 
does carefully specify its reasons for each exclusion. In this 
connection it is at least curious that a passage from the Meta­
physics , viz. 1009b5-6, mentions the sick and insane as sources 
of error even if per impossibile only two or three persons were 
found to be still healthy and sensible. It is tempting to suggest 
that in composing the EE Aristotle has decided to broaden his ac­
count of those unlikely to merit attention to their endoxa beyond 
the inexperienced young so disparaged in Book I of the NE. There 
remains, of course, the considerable difficulty of reconciling 
the rest of this important passage with our suggestion that the 
EE's way with the many is benign. Only a full-scale philological 
treatment of the disputed passage starting from the manuscripts 
themselves can be expected to resolve this issue, making a fur­
ther advance possible.
At this point our study of vocabulary and selected explicit 
methodological passages has provided some support for questioning 
the widely held traditional assumption that the NE either shares 
unequivocally and to the same degree the endoxic method of the EE 
or that in any case it represents an advance on the latter. We 
cannot claim, of course, to have demonstrated that the opposite 
opinion is true, either. Considerations have been advanced, how­
ever, that scholars sympathetic to Kenny's case for the EE can 
and should pursue in future research. This should, above all, 
concentrate on detailed comparisons of lengthy and parallel texts 
where endoxic method is at work. The three books on friendship 
are a prime candidate for such study as^iême individual chapters 
on particular virtues. In an APA presentation21* last year I urged 
an interpretation of the EE's treatment of the aporiai about 
friendship that sees it not Only as fuller, better documented
15
and more carefully laid out than its counterpart but, more im­
portantly, it shows clearer signs than does the NE of the "a- 
poremetic method" at work in the Metaphysics that Alan Code has 
so well described in recent contributions.25 In this regard it 
is worth quoting one more passage from the EE;
Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will 
best explain to us the views held on these matters and 
at the same time solve the difficulties and contradic­
tions. And this will be secured if the contradictory 
views are shown to be held with some reason. For such 
a line of argument will be most in agreement with the 
phainomena: and in the upshot, if what is said is true 
in one sense but not in another, both the contradictory 
views stand good. (Rackham's translation of 1235bl3-18)
Nothing so programmatic nor as sytematically connected with CB 
VII passages can be found in the parallel NE account of philia 
even though its discussion as a whole is considerably longer 
than the EE's· These and other differences between these two 
works surely merit further study in the light of Kenny's con­
clusions. Even if the drift of the above comments on Eudemian 
ethical method are contrary to the prevailing winds, I take 
comfort from the following remarks with which Kenny himself 
brings his first book to a close:
No doubt, when finally pressed, most scholars would say 
that their belief in the [temporal] priority of the EE 
to the NE rests not upon any particular argument but 
upon their over-all impression of the respective philo­
sophical merits of the works. Such judgments are, of 
course, partly a function of variations in the fashion­
ableness of criteria for judging philosophical merit; 
they are also very much a function of how closely a 
text has been read, analysed, and meditated upon. It 
will only be when the EE has been for some time as 
carefully and widely studied as the NE has been for 
centuries that we shall be able to make an unclouded 
judgment about their comparative worth.26
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